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OPINION 
________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 This case reaches us for the third time and requires 
us to consider the import of two recent Supreme Court 
cases, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), 
and City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015), 
on the constitutionality of the recordkeeping, labeling, 
and inspection requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2257 and 2257A (collectively, “the Statutes”) and 
their accompanying regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 75.1-75.9.  
In light of Reed, we determine that the Statutes are 
content based, and therefore require strict scrutiny review 
under the First Amendment.  We will remand to the 
District Court to determine whether the Statutes 
withstand strict scrutiny.  In light of Patel, we conclude 
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that the inspection provisions of the Statutes1 and 28 
C.F.R. § 75.5 are facially unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.   
I.  
 Since 1984, Congress has criminalized both the 
commercial and noncommercial use of children in 
sexually explicit materials.  See Free Speech Coal., Inc. 
v. Att’y Gen. (FSC I), 677 F.3d 519, 525 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(describing legislative efforts to criminalize child 
                                                 
1 By “inspection provisions” we refer to § 2257(f)(5) and 
§ 2257A(f)(5) as well as the phrase in § 2257(c) and 
§ 2257A(c) that requires recordkeepers to “make such 
records available to the Attorney General for inspection 
at all reasonable times.”  The remainder of subsection (c), 
which concerns the location of the records, does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, and we will strike down 
only the offending portion on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 
684 (1987) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted) (“A court should refrain from invalidating more 
of the statute than is necessary. . . . Whenever an act of 
Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable 
from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of 
this court to so declare, and to maintain the act in so far 
as it is valid.” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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pornography). Despite these direct prohibitions on child 
pornography, producers of sexually explicit materials 
continued to utilize youthful-looking performers.  See id. 
at 525-26 (citing Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography, Final Report, 618 (1986) (the “Report”)).  
Law enforcement was viewed as ill-equipped to visually 
determine these performers’ ages, and, as a consequence, 
the risk that children were still being used in 
pornographic materials remained.  Id.  
 In response to the Report, Congress decided to 
place the onus on producers to collect information 
demonstrating that their performers were not minors.  
Section 2257, as amended, was enacted as part of the 
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7513, 102 Stat. 4181, 4487.  
The Act requires producers of visual depictions of 
“actual sexually explicit conduct” to keep “individually 
identifiable records” documenting the identity and age of 
every performer appearing in those depictions.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(a).  Section 2257A, enacted as part of the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-248, § 503, 120 Stat. 587, 626-29, applies 
similar recordkeeping requirements to producers of 
depictions of “simulated sexually explicit conduct.”  
“Sexually explicit conduct” for the purposes of both 
§ 2257 and § 2257A consists of “(i) sexual intercourse, 
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or 
oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or 
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opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) 
sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition 
of the genitals or pubic area of any person.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2256(2)(A); see also 28 C.F.R. § 75.1(n).  “Simulated 
sexually explicit conduct” is defined as “conduct engaged 
in by performers that is depicted in a manner that would 
cause a reasonable viewer to believe that the performers 
engaged in actual sexually explicit conduct, even if they 
did not in fact do so.”  28 C.F.R. § 75.1(o).2  
 Producers of visual depictions subject to the 
Statutes are required to examine “an identification 
document” for each performer and to maintain records 
listing each performer’s name, date of birth, and any 
                                                 
2 Certain commercial producers of simulated sexually 
explicit depictions, along with some commercial 
producers of images that depict actual lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area regulated under 
§ 2257, are exempt from these recordkeeping 
requirements.  18 U.S.C. § 2257A(h).  These exemptions 
are intended to apply to industries where Congress 
believed that existing regulatory schemes already 
“adequately achieve[d] the same age-verification ends as 
the Statutes,” such as the mainstream motion picture and 
television industries.  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y 
Gen. (FSC I), 677 F.3d 519, 535 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012); see 
also 152 Cong. Rec. S8012, S8027 (July 20, 2006) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
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other name that the performer has previously used.  18 
U.S.C. § 2257(b); id. § 2257A(b).  These records must be 
maintained at the producer’s “business premises,” or at 
any other place prescribed by regulation, and shall be 
made available for inspection by the Attorney General 
“at all reasonable times.”  Id. § 2257(c); id. § 2257A(c).  
Producers must also “affix[] to every copy” of covered 
depictions “in such manner and in such form as the 
Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, a 
statement describing where the records required . . . with 
respect to all performers depicted in that copy . . . may be 
located.”  Id. § 2257(e)(1); id. § 2257A(e)(1).   
 Detailed regulations further refine the 
recordkeeping and labeling requirements under the 
Statutes.  Pursuant to these regulations, producers must 
maintain “a legible hard copy . . . or . . . electronic copy” 
of the identification documents for each performer, as 
well as a copy of each sexually explicit depiction.  28 
C.F.R. § 75.2(a)(1).  If the image is published on the 
Internet, the records also must contain either a URL or a 
“uniquely identifying reference associated with the 
location of the depiction on the Internet.”  Id.  Producers 
must also generate an index tying each depiction to all 
names used by each performer.  Id. § 75.2(a)(2)-(3); id. 
§ 75.3.  In order to comply with these requirements, 
producers are permitted to contract with a third party.  Id. 
§ 75.2(h); id. § 75.4.  Regulations further specify that a 
statement describing the records’ location must be 
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affixed to each copy of a sexually explicit depiction, and 
they also specify the location and contents of that 
statement.  Id. § 75.6; id. § 75.8.   
 The Statutes’ general command that records be 
available for inspection “at all reasonable times,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2257(c); id. § 2257A(c), is also governed by 
detailed regulations.  Investigators are “authorized to 
enter without delay and at reasonable times any 
establishment of a producer where records . . . are 
maintained to inspect during regular working hours and 
at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits 
and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of 
determining compliance” with the Statutes.  28 C.F.R. 
§ 75.5(a).  Although inspections are to be conducted 
either during normal business hours or at such times that 
the producer “is actually conducting business” related to 
covered depictions, producers must nevertheless make 
their records available for inspection for at least twenty 
hours per week.  Id. § 75.5(c). 
 Inspectors are further required by regulation to 
take several steps at the time a search is conducted to 
reassure producers of the lawfulness of any search.  
These include presenting credentials and explaining the 
limited nature and purpose of the inspection.  Id. 
§ 75.5(c)(2).  The frequency of inspections is also 
circumscribed: only one inspection is permitted during 
any four-month period, unless law enforcement has 
“reasonable suspicion” that a violation has occurred.  Id. 
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§ 75.5(d).  Although “inspections shall be conducted so 
as not to unreasonably disrupt” operations, id. 
§ 75.5(c)(3), the regulations also mandate that “[a]dvance 
notice of record inspections shall not be given,” id. 
§ 75.5(b).   
 Failure to maintain the necessary records, to affix 
the necessary statement describing the records’ location 
to each copy of a regulated depiction, or to permit a 
required inspection is a criminal offense.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(f); id. § 2257A(f).  First-time violators of § 2257 
face a maximum sentence of five years’ incarceration, 
with subsequent violations punishable by imprisonment 
of “not more than 10 years but not less than 2 years.”  Id. 
§ 2257(i).  Sentences for violations of § 2257A are 
capped at one year, unless the violation involves an effort 
to conceal a substantive offense involving the use of a 
minor in sexually explicit depictions, in which case the 
sentencing range mirrors that imposed for violations of 
§ 2257.  Id. § 2257A(i).   
II.  
 Plaintiffs are a collection of individuals, 
commercial entities, and interest groups who are engaged 
in or represent others involved in the production of 
images covered under the Statutes.3  This case first came 
                                                 
3 Specifically, these Plaintiffs are Free Speech Coalition, 
Inc., “a trade association representing more than 1,000 
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to us following the District Court’s grant of the 
Government’s motion to dismiss.  At that time, we held 
that Plaintiffs stated viable as-applied and facial claims 
under both the First and Fourth Amendments.  See FSC I, 
677 F.3d at 535-46.  Crucial to the appeal now before us, 
we held that the Statutes were content-neutral regulations 
of speech, and that their validity should be evaluated 
                                                                                                             
member businesses and individuals involved in the 
production and distribution of adult materials”; the 
American Society of Media Photographers, a trade 
association representing photographers; Thomas Hymes, 
“a journalist who operates a website related to the adult 
film industry”; Townsend Enterprises, Inc., doing 
business as the Sinclair Institute, “a producer and 
distributor of adult materials created for the purpose of 
educating adults about sexual health and fulfillment”; 
Carol Queen, “a sociologist, sexologist, and feminist sex 
educator”; Barbara Nitke, “a faculty member for the 
School of Visual Arts in New York City and a 
photographer”; Marie L. Levine, also known as Nina 
Hartley, a performer, sex educator, and producer of adult 
entertainment; Betty Dodson, “a sexologist, sex educator, 
author, and artist”; Carlin Ross, “who hosts a website 
with Dodson providing individuals ashamed of their 
genitalia with a forum for anonymously discussing and 
posting images of their genitalia”; and photographers 
Barbara Alper, David Steinberg, and Dave Levingston.  
FSC I, 677 F.3d at 524 n.1. 
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under intermediate scrutiny for purposes of the First 
Amendment challenge. 
 In reaching this conclusion, we relied on Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), and focused 
on the purpose of the statute—protecting children from 
being used in child pornography—in determining 
whether the Government enacted the Statutes as a means 
of discriminating against a form of protected speech.  
FSC I, 677 F.3d at 533 (“In other words, ‘the 
government’s purpose is the controlling consideration,’ 
and ‘[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others.’” (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-92)).  In 
reaching the earlier decision, we also considered the 
opinions of the D.C. Circuit and the en banc Sixth 
Circuit, the two other courts of appeals to have 
considered the validity of § 2257.  Id. at 530-33 
(discussing Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 
321, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc), and Am. Library 
Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).4  In both 
cases, our sister circuits persuasively concluded that 
§ 2257 was content neutral.  Connection, 557 F.3d at 
328-29 (concluding that § 2257 was content neutral 
because the statute had a “valid speech-related end—
                                                 
4 Neither Connection nor American Library Association 
addressed § 2257A.  However, the analysis is the same.   
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eliminating child pornography—followed by a means of 
achieving that end, a proof-of-age requirement that refers 
to the content of the speech . . . not because of its effect 
on the audience but because it is the kind of speech that 
implicates the government’s ban on child pornography”); 
Am. Library Ass’n, 33 F.3d at 86 (“Congress enacted 
[§ 2257] not to regulate the content of sexually explicit 
materials, but to protect children by deterring the 
production and distribution of child pornography.”).   
 We agreed with our sister circuits and held that the 
Statutes were content neutral because “Congress enacted 
the Statutes for the purpose of protecting children from 
exploitation by pornographers,” and “[a]ny impact by the 
Statutes on Plaintiffs’ protected speech is collateral to the 
Statutes’ purpose of protecting children from 
pornographers.”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 534.  Accordingly, 
we determined that intermediate scrutiny was 
appropriate.  We went on to hold that Plaintiffs had stated 
valid as-applied and facial First Amendment claims, and 
remanded the case to the District Court to allow Plaintiffs 
“to conduct discovery and develop a record supporting 
their claim that the Statutes burden substantially more 
speech than necessary.”  Id. at 537-38.5 
                                                 
5 To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a statute must: “(1) 
advance[] a ‘substantial’ governmental interest; (2) . . . 
not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary’ 
(i.e., the statute must be narrowly tailored); and (3) 
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 In FSC I, we also remanded Plaintiffs’ as-applied 
and facial Fourth Amendment claims to the District 
Court.  We determined that the record needed further 
development in order to ascertain whether the 
Government’s behavior in conducting the inspections 
constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
at 544.  We also held that, if the Government’s conduct 
did qualify as a search, the record was insufficient to 
ascertain whether the administrative search exception to 
the expectation-of-privacy test was applicable.  Id. 
 On remand, the District Court conducted a bench 
trial on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims.  Free Speech Coal., 
Inc. v. Holder (FSC II), 957 F. Supp. 2d 564 (E.D. Pa. 
2013).  It concluded that the Statutes and regulations 
passed constitutional muster with one exception: 
inspections without prior notice to examine records 
located in private residences violated the Fourth 
                                                                                                             
leave[] open ‘ample alternative channels for 
communication.’”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 535 (quoting Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).  In 
order to be narrowly tailored, a statute “need not be the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means” of achieving the 
governmental interest.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.  In FSC I, 
Plaintiffs “concede[d] that protecting children from 
exploitation by pornographers is an important, indeed 
compelling, governmental interest.”  677 F.3d at 535 
(internal quotation marks omitted).    
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Amendment.  Id. at 607-08.  The parties developed the 
factual record with an understanding that “the [First 
Amendment] question before the court with respect to 
narrow-tailoring is whether the Statutes burden 
substantially more of Plaintiffs’ speech than is necessary 
to further the government’s legitimate interest of 
protecting our children.”  Id. at 589 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In other words, the parties focused on 
whether the Statutes survived intermediate scrutiny.  The 
parties similarly developed the record for the facial 
overbreadth claim with an eye towards intermediate 
scrutiny, because the overbreadth doctrine requires “that 
the statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only in an 
absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”  FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 593-94 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 
(2008)).  
 This case then came to us again.  Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. (FSC III), 787 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 
2015), vacated and reh’g granted, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15448 (3d Cir., Sept. 01, 2015).  We relied 
heavily on the extensive record developed in the District 
Court, and we affirmed the District Court’s conclusion 
that the Statutes and regulations satisfied intermediate 
scrutiny under the First Amendment.6  However, in doing 
                                                 
6 We also concluded that Free Speech Coalition and the 
American Society of Media Photographers lacked 
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so, we noted that the Statutes may not have been able to 
survive strict scrutiny.  Specifically, we “reject[ed] the 
Government’s contention that age verification of all 
performers regardless of their actual age always furthers 
the Government’s interest in preventing the sexual 
exploitation of minors.”  Id. at 156.  Moreover, “the 
number of performers to whom the Statutes apply, yet for 
whom requiring identification does not protect children, 
is not insignificant.”  Id. at 158.  Nonetheless, the 
Statutes satisfied intermediate scrutiny because, unlike 
strict scrutiny, “the Government need not employ the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means.”  Id. at 157.  We 
also affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that the 
Statutes were not facially overbroad, as “the invalid 
applications of the Statutes that Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated still pale in comparison with the Statutes’ 
legitimate applications.”  Id. at 164.  Their “broad 
legitimate sweep and the Government’s exceedingly 
compelling interest in this case counsels against facial 
overbreadth.”  Id. at 166.   
 After concluding that Plaintiffs had standing to 
pursue injunctive relief as to their Fourth Amendment 
claims, id. at 167-68, we held that the warrantless 
                                                                                                             
associational standing to bring as-applied claims on 
behalf of the entire adult film industry.  Free Speech 
Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. (FSC III), 787 F.3d 142, 153-54 
(3d Cir. 2015).   
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inspection regime detailed in 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 was 
unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs, id. at 172-73.  
We first determined that the production of sexually 
explicit images was not a “closely regulated” industry 
such that the administrative search exception to the 
warrant requirement was applicable.  Id. at 170-71.  We 
also held that, even if this was a closely regulated 
industry, the warrantless inspection provision was 
unnecessary, and thus unreasonable, and would still not 
pass Fourth Amendment muster.  Id. at 171.  We saw no 
need to rule on the facial validity of 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 or 
address the constitutionality of the inspection provisions 
of the Statutes themselves.  Id. at 169 n.21.   
 We decided FSC III on May 14, 2015.  Two 
intervening Supreme Court cases now lead us to revisit 
our prior holdings in this case.  Specifically, Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), requires us to 
take another look at our holding that intermediate 
scrutiny applies to the First Amendment analysis, and 
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015), 
requires us to reconsider our holding concerning the 
constitutionality of the inspection provisions.   
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III.   
 In light of Reed and Patel, Plaintiffs filed a petition 
for rehearing.  After receiving a response from the United 
States, and a reply to the response from Plaintiffs, we 
vacated our judgment and opinion in FSC III and granted 
the request for a rehearing.  As a result of Reed, we now 
determine that the Statutes are subject to strict scrutiny 
because they are content-based restrictions of speech.  As 
a result of Patel, we determine that the inspection 
provisions of the Statutes and § 75.5 are facially 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.   
IV.   
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review legal questions de novo, 
including the constitutionality of the Statutes and 
regulations at issue here.  ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 
181, 186 (3d Cir. 2008).  The court’s factual findings 
following a bench trial are typically reviewed for clear 
error.  Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 
514 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Am. Soc’y for Testing & 
Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir. 
2007)).   
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V.   
 Reed requires us to reconsider our determination in 
FSC I that the Statutes are content neutral, which in turn 
impacts our decision in FSC III that the Statutes survive 
intermediate scrutiny.  In Reed, the Supreme Court 
addressed the validity of a sign code that banned the 
display of outdoor signs anywhere in town without a 
permit, but exempted twenty-three classes of signs from 
this requirement.  135 S. Ct. at 2224.  The Court focused 
on three classes of signs that received varying levels of 
preferential treatment under the code: ideological signs, 
political signs, and temporary directional signs.  Id. at 
2224-25.  Plaintiffs in the case challenged the less 
preferential treatment given to temporary directional 
signs.  Id. at 2224. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the Sign Code was content neutral.  Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).  
That court declared that “Gilbert did not adopt its 
regulation of speech because it disagreed with the 
message conveyed,” and its “interests in regulat[ing] 
temporary signs [were] unrelated to the content of the 
sign.”  Id. at 1070-71.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Ninth Circuit quoted language from Hill v. Colorado, 
530 U.S. 703 (2000), and Ward, the Supreme Court case 
we relied on in FSC I when we determined that the 
Statutes were content neutral: 
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 Furthermore, in Hill, the Supreme 
Court explained why a statute, which only 
restricted certain types of speech-related 
conduct, is properly considered content 
neutral.  The Court reiterated that “[t]he 
principal inquiry in determining content 
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in 
time, place, or manner cases in particular, is 
whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.”  
Hill, 530 U.S. at 719, 120 S. Ct. 2480 
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). 
Reed, 707 F.3d at 1071.   
 The Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the 
“Sign Code is content based on its face,” because the 
restrictions “depend entirely on the communicative 
content of the sign.”  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.  Thus, 
strict scrutiny, not intermediate scrutiny, was the 
appropriate standard, as it was error to look to the 
purpose of the Sign Code in determining the level of 
scrutiny that should be applied.  Id. at 2228.  The Court 
instructed that “[a] law that is content based on its face is 
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s 
benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of 
‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated 
speech.” Id. (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).  “In other words, an 
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innocuous justification cannot transform a facially 
content-based law into one that is content neutral.”  Id.  
The Supreme Court further clarified that Ward’s inquiry 
into the purpose of a law applies only if the law is 
content neutral on its face.  Id. at 2228-29 (“But Ward’s 
framework ‘applies only if a statute is content neutral.’” 
(quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 766 (Kennedy, J., dissenting))).  
Under Reed, in determining whether the Statutes 
are content based or content neutral for purposes of our 
First Amendment analysis—and thus subject to strict 
versus intermediate scrutiny—our first step must be to 
conduct a facial examination of the Statutes.  Id. at 2228 
(stating that the “first step in the content-neutrality 
analysis [is] determining whether the law is content 
neutral on its face”).  Only if a law is content neutral on 
its face may we then look to any benign purpose.  Id. 
(“That is why we have repeatedly considered whether a 
law is content neutral on its face before turning to the 
law’s justification or purpose.”).  The prime example of 
an appropriate examination of a law’s benign purpose is 
Ward itself, which involved a facially content-neutral ban 
on the use of private sound amplification systems in a 
city-owned music venue.  491 U.S. at 787, 788 n.2.  Only 
because the regulation was content neutral on its face did 
the Supreme Court look to the purpose of the regulation, 
which was noise control.  Id. at 792.   
 Here, each of the Statutes we review is clearly 
content based on its face.  The Statutes apply only to 
 22 
 
“visual depictions . . . of actual sexually explicit 
conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2257, and of “simulated sexually 
explicit conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2257A; see United States 
v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) 
(holding that a statute was content based because it 
“applies only to channels primarily dedicated to sexually 
explicit adult programming or other programming that is 
indecent” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Thus, 
under Reed, strict scrutiny applies because the Statutes’ 
restrictions “depend entirely on the communicative 
content” of the speech.  135 S. Ct. at 2227.   
 The United States concedes that, in light of Reed, 
our analysis in FSC I, which relied on Ward, cannot 
stand.7  Instead, in an attempt to avoid the high hurdle of 
strict scrutiny, the Government argues that the secondary 
effects doctrine of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), and the intermediate scrutiny 
that applies in such cases, is applicable here.  The 
Government is wrong.   
                                                 
7 Our sister circuits have also noted that Reed represents 
a drastic change in First Amendment jurisprudence.  See, 
e.g., Cahaly v. LaRosa, 796 F.3d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(noting that Reed “conflicts with, and therefore 
abrogates, our previous descriptions of content 
neutrality”); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 
412 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that Reed understands content 
discrimination differently” than the prior panel decision). 
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 The secondary effects doctrine requires a court to 
conclude that a statute is content neutral, even when on 
its face it draws a distinction based on content, if the 
court determines that the statute targets the adverse 
secondary effects of protected speech and not the speech 
itself.  Id. at 47 (reasoning that a local zoning ordinance 
is content neutral even though it “treats theaters that 
specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of 
theaters”).  In the most recent secondary effects case, 
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 
425, 436 (2002), a plurality of the Supreme Court held 
that a local zoning ordinance that applied only to adult 
establishments was content neutral because its purpose 
was to reduce crime that invariably accompanied these 
types of establishments, not to suppress speech.  Justice 
Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote in Alameda 
Books, calls this content-neutral designation “something 
of a fiction,” because, facially, such ordinances are 
“content based, and we should call them so.”  Id. at 448 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  Nonetheless, he 
would also apply intermediate scrutiny to these 
commonsense regulations.  Id. (“A zoning restriction that 
is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech 
should be subject to intermediate rather than strict 
scrutiny.”).   
 While Reed explicitly proscribes such an inquiry 
into the purpose of a facially content-based statute, 135 
S. Ct. at 2228 (“A law that is content based on its face is 
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subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s 
benign motive, content-neutral justification or lack of 
‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated 
speech.”  (quoting Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429)), 
we need not reach the issue of whether the secondary 
effects doctrine survives Reed because this is not a 
secondary effects case.   
 We arrive at this conclusion by recognizing that, if 
the secondary effects doctrine survives,8 Reed counsels 
against expanding its application beyond the only context 
to which the Supreme Court has ever applied it: 
regulations affecting physical purveyors of adult sexually 
explicit content.  See Renton, 475 U.S. at 45 (adult movie 
theater); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282 
                                                 
8 Although we do not reach the issue, we agree with the 
dissent that it is doubtful that Reed has overturned the 
Renton secondary effects doctrine.  See BBL, Inc. v. 
Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 326 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We 
don’t think Reed upends established doctrine for 
evaluating regulation of businesses that offer sexually 
explicit entertainment.”).  Our disagreement with the 
dissent is, rather, about whether the secondary effects 
doctrine is applicable in this case. 
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(2000) (erotic dancing establishment); Alameda Books, 
535 U.S. at 431 (adult-oriented department store).9   
 The primary justification for the secondary effects 
doctrine supports our narrow interpretation of the 
doctrine’s breadth.  It was originally created to ensure 
that local governments have the flexibility to zone their 
cities in a manner congruent with the “city’s interest in 
the present and future character of its neighborhood.”  
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72 (1976) 
(plurality).  Young, which laid the foundation for the 
secondary effects doctrine in a footnote, allowed a city to 
enact an “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance” after determining 
“that a concentration of ‘adult’ movie theaters causes the 
area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects 
which are not attributable to theaters showing other types 
of films.”  Id. at 71 n.34.  Justice Powell, who concurred 
in part and in the judgment, did so because “zoning, 
when used to preserve the character of specific areas of a 
city, is perhaps ‘the most essential function performed by 
                                                 
9 We recognize that this Court has previously termed an 
abortion buffer zone case to be a “secondary effects 
case.”  See Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 
280 n.17 (3d Cir. 2009).  Reed “impels us to reevaluate 
[Brown’s passage about the secondary effects doctrine] . . 
. because [Reed] weakens the conceptual underpinnings 
of [this passage].”  E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
United States, 508 F.3d 126, 132 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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local government, for it is one of the primary means by 
which we protect that sometimes difficult to define 
concept of quality of life.’”  Id. at 80 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting 
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 81 (1976)). 
 Renton explicitly adopted the secondary effects 
doctrine ten years later, and the Court emphasized that a 
zoning scheme that preserves the quality of life for the 
community by restricting adult theaters to certain areas 
“is the essence of zoning.”  475 U.S. at 54.  Furthermore, 
the most recent secondary effects case to come before the 
Supreme Court, Alameda Books, was also an exercise of 
a municipality’s zoning power, as the ordinance at issue 
banned adult “mega stores.”  The plurality opinion in 
Alameda Books placed great weight on the availability of 
tools for local governments to use in managing their 
cities.  535 U.S. at 438 (plurality) (“In Renton, we 
specifically refused to set such a high bar for 
municipalities that want to address merely the secondary 
effects of protected speech.”).  Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
concurring in the judgment, which, again, provided the 
crucial fifth vote, focused particularly on the role of 
zoning.  Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“The law does not require a city to ignore these [adverse 
secondary effects] if it uses its zoning power in a 
reasonable way to ameliorate them without suppressing 
speech.”); id. (“These secondary consequences are not 
always immune from regulation by zoning laws even 
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though they are produced by speech.”).  The dissent in 
Alameda Books likewise recognized the applicability of 
the secondary effects doctrine to the zoning context.  Id. 
at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “zoning 
of businesses based on their sales of expressive adult 
material receives mid-level scrutiny”).   
 The Supreme Court has applied the secondary 
effects doctrine to one case that did not involve a zoning 
ordinance, although that case nonetheless involved a 
brick-and-mortar purveyor of adult sexually explicit 
conduct and a local government’s attempt to regulate 
such businesses.  See Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 282-84.  In 
Pap’s, the Court applied the secondary effects doctrine to 
an erotic dancing establishment’s challenge to a local 
public-nudity ordinance.  Id. at 295.  The plurality 
concluded that “the ordinance prohibiting public nudity is 
aimed at combating crime and other negative effects 
caused by the presence of adult entertainment 
establishments . . . and not at suppressing the erotic 
message conveyed by this type of nude dancing.”  Id. at 
291.  Justice Stevens protested that “we have limited our 
secondary effects cases to zoning” because zoning 
regulates location as opposed to completely banning 
expression.  Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Nonetheless, the plurality and Justice Souter’s separate 
opinion both agreed that the secondary effects doctrine 
was applicable to this municipal regulation as well.  Id. at 
293 (plurality); id. at 312-13 (Souter, J., concurring in 
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part and dissenting in part).  Thus, even taking Pap’s into 
account, the secondary effects doctrine has been limited 
in application to the regulation of physical purveyors of 
adult sexually explicit speech, whether done through a 
city’s zoning power or through another means.   
We note that the Supreme Court has considered 
and rejected the applicability of the secondary effects 
doctrine to cases not involving adult physical 
establishments.  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 
(1988) (plurality) (city ordinance prohibiting protests in 
front of foreign embassies); City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) 
(noting that there were “no secondary effects [arising 
from litter or relating to esthetics] attributable to 
respondent publishers’ newsracks that distinguish them 
from the newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on the 
sidewalk”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) 
(striking down a statute prohibiting flag burning because 
it was based on the reaction of others to the flag burning, 
which is a primary, not a secondary effect, of speech).  In 
addition, the Supreme Court has also rejected the use of 
the secondary effects doctrine in the context of Internet 
and televised pornography.  United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (holding that 
“[o]ur zoning cases . . . are irrelevant to the question 
here” because the alleged secondary effect, signal bleed, 
was regulated due to the impact signal bleed would have 
on the audience, which is really a primary effect); Reno 
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v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (rejecting the 
argument that a law banning indecent or offensive speech 
on the Internet in order to protect children was a form of 
“cyberzoning”).  
We deem it significant that the Supreme Court has 
never actually applied the secondary effects doctrine 
outside the realm of brick-and-mortar purveyors of adult 
sexually explicit content.  We decline to do so now, 
because any application of the secondary effects doctrine 
beyond what the Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed 
would bring this case into direct conflict with Reed’s 
pronouncement that we cannot look behind a facially 
content-based law to a benign motive in order to shield 
the law from the rigors of strict scrutiny.  135 S. Ct. at 
2228 (“In other words, an innocuous justification cannot 
transform a facially content-based law into one that is 
content neutral.”).  Despite hints of a broadened view of 
the secondary effects doctrine suggested in Boos and 
similar cases, the Court’s most recent pronouncement in 
Reed counsels against such a broad interpretation and we 
are obligated to follow its directives.  See United States v. 
Extreme Assoc’s, Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[E]ven where a lower court’s analytical position has 
merit, the obligation to follow applicable Supreme Court 
precedent is in no way abrogated.”).10    
                                                 
10 At oral argument, counsel for the Government stated 
that Reed “will be a much litigated decision” because 
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We also note that an expansion of the secondary 
effects doctrine beyond brick-and-mortar purveyors of 
adult sexually explicit conduct to other regulations, even 
those enacted for benign reasons, could lead to the 
erosion of First Amendment freedoms.  See Boos, 485 
U.S. at 337-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) 
(protesting the applicability of the Renton analysis to 
political speech and expressing a concern that “it could 
set the Court on a road that will lead to the evisceration 
of First Amendment freedoms”).  As the Court in Reed 
recognized:   
[i]nnocent motives do not eliminate the 
danger of censorship presented by a facially 
content-based statute, as future government 
officials may one day wield such statutes to 
suppress disfavored speech.  That is why the 
First Amendment expressly targets the 
operation of the laws—i.e., the 
                                                                                                             
“it’s so broad and has impacts in many First Amendment 
areas.”  Tr. at 47:4-9.  That may be so.  Nonetheless, the 
language of Reed is plain.  It clearly rejects any 
justification of a facially content-based law because of 
some benign purpose.  If the secondary effects doctrine is 
going to have a broader reach, then existing 
jurisprudence suggests that the Supreme Court will need 
to take that step. 
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abridg[ement] of speech—rather than 
merely the motives of those who enacted 
them. 
135 S. Ct. at 2229.  To allow the secondary effects 
doctrine to transform a facially content-based law into a 
content-neutral one any time the Government can point 
to a laudable purpose behind the regulation that is 
unrelated to protected speech would render Reed a 
nullity.   
We do not disagree with the dissent that “[i]f a 
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, 
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line 
of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case 
which directly controls.”  Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  
Our disagreement is with which Supreme Court case 
directly controls.  Because the secondary effects doctrine 
is inapplicable here, Renton does not control.  Instead, we 
are bound by Reed, and although the scope of Reed may 
have broad implications for First Amendment doctrine, 
we must leave to the Supreme Court “the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.”  Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 
U.S. at 484.   
Here, the Statutes, facially, are content based, as 
they apply only to “actual sexually explicit conduct,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2257, and “simulated sexually explicit 
conduct,” id. § 2257A.  Despite the very commendable 
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purpose of seeking to prevent child pornography by 
making it easier for law enforcement officials to ascertain 
the ages of the performers in the pornographic materials, 
we can no longer look to the purpose of a law that draws 
a content-based distinction on its face in determining 
what level of scrutiny to apply.  See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 
2228-29 (instructing courts to examine the purpose of a 
law only if the law is content neutral on its face).   
Accordingly, the Statutes are subject to strict 
scrutiny.  The Government therefore has the burden of 
“prov[ing] that the restriction furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”  
Id. at 2231.11  Because the record in this case was 
developed with an understanding that the Statutes were 
instead subject to the lesser standard of intermediate 
scrutiny, we will remand to the District Court so that it 
can determine whether the record requires further 
development and whether the Statutes survive strict 
                                                 
11 We note that Plaintiffs have conceded that the 
Government’s interest in protecting children from sexual 
exploitation by pornographers is compelling, and thus the 
District Court’s inquiry on remand should be focused on 
whether the Statutes are narrowly tailored to serve this 
interest. 
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scrutiny.12  By remanding for an application of strict 
scrutiny we are not “dooming” the Statutes as the dissent 
suggests.  Nothing in our analysis dictates a conclusion 
that the Statutes will not (or will) pass strict scrutiny.  
Recently, the Supreme Court, in a First Amendment 
challenge to Florida’s judicial conduct rules regarding 
campaign solicitations, held that the regulation at issue 
was “one of the rare cases in which a speech restriction 
withstands strict scrutiny.”  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 
135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015).  On remand, it is for the 
District Court to ascertain whether the Government has 
met its burden of showing that the “proposed alternatives 
will not be as effective as the challenged [Statutes].”  
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 665 
(2004).   
VI. 
                                                 
12 We remand both the as-applied and overbreadth 
claims, as the level of scrutiny is a key factor in both as-
applied and overbreadth challenges.  Conchatta Inc. v. 
Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 267 (3d Cir. 2006); Connection 
Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 333 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(en banc).  We also remand for the District Court to 
determine if Free Speech Coalition and the American 
Society of Media Photographers have associational 
standing, as the level of scrutiny is relevant in resolving 
this issue.  FSC III, 787 F.3d at 153-54. 
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The other recent Supreme Court case that requires 
us to reconsider our holding in FSC III is City of Los 
Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).  Patel dealt 
with a city ordinance that created an inspection regime 
with similarities to the one at issue here.  Compare id. at 
2448 (“Section 41.49(3)(a) . . . states . . . that hotel guest 
records ‘shall be made available to any officer of the Los 
Angeles Police Department for inspection,’ provided that 
‘[w]henever possible, the inspection shall be conducted 
at a time and in a manner that minimizes any interference 
with the operation of the business.’” (quoting L.A. Mun. 
Code § 41.49(3)(a)), with 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (providing 
that the records must be available for inspection “at all 
reasonable times),” id. § 2257A (same), and 28 C.F.R. § 
75.5(c)(3) (“The inspections shall be conducted so as not 
to unreasonably disrupt the operations of the 
establishment.”).   
 The Supreme Court, after noting that “facial 
challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not 
categorically barred or especially disfavored,” Patel, 135 
S. Ct. at 2449, struck down the hotel inspection 
regulation as facially unconstitutional because it did not 
provide the hotel operators an opportunity for 
precompliance review by a neutral arbiter, id. at 2454.  In 
doing so, the Court rejected the argument that the hotel 
industry was “closely regulated,” such that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and held that, even if 
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it was, warrantless searches in this context were 
unreasonable.  Id. at 2454-56.   
In light of Patel, we now turn to Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claim that the inspection provisions of the 
Statutes and § 75.5 are unconstitutional.  First, we 
determine that Plaintiffs have standing.  Next, we decide 
that it is appropriate to consider Plaintiffs’ facial 
challenge to the inspection provisions.  Finally, we hold 
that the inspection regime is unconstitutional because the 
administrative search exception to the warrant 
requirement for closely regulated industries is 
inapplicable.  Even if it were applicable, it does not pass 
muster under the test for reasonableness.   
A. 
Before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claim, we address the Government’s 
justiciability arguments.13  The Government urges that 
Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief 
because they have not demonstrated sufficient threat of 
                                                 
13 The Government has not renewed these arguments on 
rehearing, as we directed the parties to focus on the 
applicability of the secondary effects doctrine.  
Nonetheless, our opinion in FSC III has been vacated, 
and we have an obligation to address our jurisdiction 
before we can turn to the merits.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for 
a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1998).   
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injury and their claims of future harm are not redressable 
through injunctive relief given that no inspection 
program has been in place since 2008.  The Government 
also points to this lack of an existing inspection regime as 
proof that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims are not 
ripe. 
Standing to seek injunctive relief requires a 
plaintiff to show (1) “that he is under threat of suffering 
‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and particularized”; (2) 
“the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical”; (3) “it must be fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant”; and (4) “it must be 
likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or 
redress the injury.”  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 
U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 
(2000)).  That some of FSC’s members have previously 
undergone searches pursuant to the regulations here is 
not sufficient on its own to confer standing to seek 
injunctive relief.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (“‘Past exposure to illegal 
conduct does not in itself show a present case or 
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if 
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 
effects.’” (omission in original) (quoting O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974))); see also 
McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 225 (3d Cir. 
2012) (holding that past injuries “may suffice to confer 
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individual standing for monetary relief” but “a plaintiff 
seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate a likelihood of 
future harm”).  Accordingly, we focus on the threat of 
future harm for purposes of this standing inquiry. 
Here, despite the lack of an existing inspection 
regime to implement § 75.5, Plaintiffs are suffering real 
costs as a condition of compliance with a regulation that 
they urge is unconstitutional.  Sufficient injury exists to 
confer standing where “the regulation is directed at 
[Plaintiffs] in particular; it requires them to make 
significant changes in their everyday business practices; 
[and] if they fail to observe the . . . rule they are quite 
clearly exposed to the imposition of strong sanctions,” 
even where there is no pending prosecution.  Pic–A–State 
Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1300 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(omission in original) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)); see also 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 185 (3d Cir. 
2010) (standing existed where plaintiffs were “direct 
targets of an ordinance they allege to be unconstitutional, 
complaining of what that ordinance would compel them 
to do”), vacated on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2958 
(2011).  Here, those Plaintiffs who generate images 
within the reach of the Statutes face criminal prosecution 
if they do not make their records available for at least 
twenty hours per week as required by regulation.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2257(f)(5); id. § 2257A(f)(5); 28 C.F.R 
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§ 75.5(c)(1).  Even without a formal inspection regime in 
place, Plaintiffs must still comply with § 75.5’s 
requirements and be prepared to face an inspection 
without warning and at law enforcement’s discretion.  
Each week, Plaintiffs either personally or through a 
custodian must arrange their businesses to have access to 
their records during specific times.  The cost of 
complying with this regulation thus affects each producer 
of sexually explicit images in a concrete way that is 
sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact. 
Compounding this injury is that the threat of future 
inspection is not remote, despite the Government’s 
assurances to the contrary.  There is no dispute that 
Plaintiffs intend to continue to engage in conduct that 
subjects them to enforcement under the Statutes.  And 
nothing prevents law enforcement from resuming 
inspections pursuant to § 75.5, even if we accept the 
Government’s representation that it has no current plans 
to do so.  Further, although not sufficient on its own to 
support standing, the fact that some of FSC’s members 
have been subjected to records inspections in the past 
makes the threat of future inspections more credible.  See 
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2345 
(2014) (“[P]ast enforcement against the same conduct is 
good evidence that the threat of enforcement is not 
‘chimerical.’” (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 459 (1974))).  Therefore, we conclude that Plaintiffs 
have also demonstrated that the threat of future harm is 
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“actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  
Summers, 555 U.S. at 493. 
Viewed this way, Plaintiffs’ injury is also 
redressable.  “[S]tanding requires that there be 
redressability, which is ‘a showing that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.’” Constitution Party of 
Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 368 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Toll Bros. v. Twp. of 
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009)).  A 
declaration that § 75.5 is unconstitutional and an 
injunction barring the Government from conducting 
searches in the manner currently prescribed would 
alleviate the costs associated with making records 
available for physical inspection twenty hours per week 
and remove the real threat of inspections described 
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above.14  For these reasons, we hold Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claims are justiciable.15 
                                                 
14 The Government does not challenge the traceability 
requirement, and rightfully so.  There can be no doubt 
that the challenged regulation caused the injury-in-fact of 
which Plaintiffs complain.  See Toll Bros. v. Twp. of 
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (“If the 
injury-in-fact prong focuses on whether the plaintiff 
suffered harm, then the traceability prong focuses on who 
inflicted that harm.”). 
 
15 For the same reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claim is also ripe.  Ripeness is a separate 
doctrine from standing, but both doctrines originate from 
the same Article III requirement of a case or controversy.  
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 
n.5 (2014) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 
U.S. 332, 335 (2006)); see also Presbytery of N.J. of 
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 
1462 (3d Cir. 1994) (standing concerns “who may bring 
the action” and ripeness involves “when a proper party 
may bring an action” (emphasis added)).  Here, whether 
Plaintiffs have standing or their claims are ripe for 
adjudication both turn on whether the threat of future 
harm under the Statutes is sufficiently immediate to 
constitute a cognizable injury.  See Presbytery of N.J., 40 
F.3d at 1462 (“[I]t is of course true that if no injury has 
occurred, the plaintiff can be told either that she cannot 
 41 
 
B.   
In FSC III, we addressed only the as-applied 
constitutionality of the regulations, and we found them to 
be unconstitutional as-applied to Plaintiffs.  However, 
given the similarity between the inspection provisions of 
the Statutes and the regulation at issue in Patel,16 we now 
                                                                                                             
sue, or that she cannot sue yet.” (quoting Smith v. Wis. 
Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 
1141 (7th Cir. 1994))).  Here, the threat of future 
inspections has caused Plaintiffs to incur ongoing costs to 
comply with the regulations.  Under these circumstances, 
Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe. 
 
16 The inspection provisions of the Statutes, as detailed 
supra, provide that any person to whom the Statutes 
apply “shall maintain the records required by this section 
at his business premises, or at such other place as the 
Attorney General may by regulation prescribe and shall 
make such records available to the Attorney General for 
inspection at all reasonable times.”  18 U.S.C. § 2257; id. 
§ 2257A.  In contrast, the applicable provision in Patel 
stated that hotel guest records “‘shall be made available 
to any office of the Los Angeles Police Department for 
inspection,’ provided that ‘[w]henever possible, the 
inspection shall be conducted at a time and in a manner 
that minimizes any interference with the operation of the 
business.’”  City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 
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hold that the inspection provisions of the Statutes and 
§ 75.5 are facially unconstitutional.   
Given this shift in analysis, we first discuss the 
propriety of considering a facial challenge under the 
Fourth Amendment, which is “not categorically barred or 
especially disfavored.”  Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2449.  A 
facial challenge attacks the statute itself, not a particular 
application, and thus is rightly “the most difficult . . . to 
mount successfully.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).  Patel directly 
addressed the validity of a facial challenge under the 
Fourth Amendment, and noted that “on numerous 
occasions [we have] declared statutes facially invalid 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 2450 (citing 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1987), 
Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001), Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 574 (1980), and Torres v. 
Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 466 (1979)).   
The Court specifically rejected the argument that 
“facial challenges to statutes authorizing warrantless 
                                                                                                             
2448 (2015) (quoting L.A. Mun. Code § 41.49).  The 
Government, in its motion opposing re-hearing, does not 
seriously contest the applicability of Patel to this case.  
Instead, it claims that it is modifying the regulations to 
comply with our decision in FSC III and with Patel.   
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searches must fail because such searches will never be 
unconstitutional in all applications.”  Id.  This argument 
failed because, under the Fourth Amendment, “the proper 
focus of the constitutional inquiry is searches that the law 
actually authorizes, not for those for which it is 
irrelevant.”  Id. at 2451.  Thus, searches conducted under 
an exception to the warrant requirement, or pursuant to a 
warrant itself, would obviously not be unconstitutional in 
their application, and thus are irrelevant to our analysis of 
a statute’s facial validity “because they do not involve 
actual applications of the statute.”  Id.  As the Supreme 
Court did in Patel, we will now consider Plaintiffs’ facial 
challenge to this inspection regime.  
C.  
In FSC I, we directed the District Court to consider 
whether an inspection done in accordance with the 
Statutes and § 75.5 “was a ‘search’ under the Fourth 
Amendment pursuant to either the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test set forth in [Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)] or the common-law-trespass 
test described in [United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012)].”  677 F.3d at 544.  After developing a thorough 
record, the District Court concluded that the warrantless 
inspections conducted pursuant to regulation were 
searches under both tests.  As to the Katz analysis, the 
District Court held that the inspections invaded areas to 
which the public did not have access and in which there 
was a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., private 
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offices, storage rooms, and residences).  FSC II, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d at 602-03.  And the physical presence of law 
enforcement officers in those areas also constituted 
trespasses under the Jones framework.  Id. at 603-04.  
The Government does not contest this analysis, and we 
see no reason to reach a different conclusion, especially 
after Patel. 
In Patel, the Court described two different types of 
administrative searches.  Recognizing that a warrantless 
administrative search provision would normally be 
facially unconstitutional if there was no “opportunity for 
precompliance review,” 135 S. Ct. at 2451, it also noted 
that if the establishment was part of a “closely regulated” 
industry, the ordinance could be “facially valid under the 
more relaxed standard that applies to searches of this 
category of businesses, id. at 2454.   In this case, the 
constitutionality of the warrantless searches under the 
Fourth Amendment rises and falls with the administrative 
search exception to the warrant requirement applicable to 
closely regulated industries.  “Searches conducted absent 
a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, subject to certain exceptions.”  United 
States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2014) (en 
banc).  “[T]he few situations in which a search may be 
conducted in the absence of a warrant have been 
carefully delineated and the burden is on those seeking 
the exemption to show the need for it.”  California v. 
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Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 589 n.5 (1991) (quoting United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)). 
As we explained in FSC I, “[c]ertain industries 
have such a history of government oversight that no 
reasonable expectation of privacy could exist.”  677 F.3d 
at 544.  Under these circumstances, “the warrant and 
probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional 
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a 
government search, have lessened application.”  New 
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, “where the privacy interests of the owner 
are weakened and the government interests in regulating 
particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a 
warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well 
be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id.  Even if a business is part of a closely 
regulated industry, we must consider whether the 
warrantless searches themselves are reasonable.  This 
requires examining whether “the following criteria are 
met: (1) the regulatory scheme furthers a substantial 
government interest; (2) the warrantless inspections are 
necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the 
inspection program, in terms of certainty and regularity 
of its application, is a constitutionally adequate substitute 
for a warrant.”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 544 (citing Burger, 
482 U.S. at 702-03). 
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1.  
To determine whether an industry is closely 
regulated, factors to consider include the “duration of the 
regulation’s existence, pervasiveness of the regulatory 
scheme, and regularity of the regulation’s application.”  
Id.  Here, the Government points to the fact that since 
1978, Congress has criminalized the commercial use of 
children in sexually explicit materials.  See id. at 525.  
Since 1988, Congress has imposed recordkeeping 
requirements similar to those currently embodied in 
§ 2257.  Id.  Some regulation of sexually explicit images, 
even those not depicting children, has therefore been in 
place for some time.   
But the regulations in this area are not as pervasive 
as in other industries previously deemed closely 
regulated.  For example, in determining whether the 
Pennsylvania funeral industry was closely regulated, we 
looked to the “broad range of standards that funeral 
directors in Pennsylvania have long been required to 
comply with,” including licensing requirements, health 
standards, funeral home services requirements, federal 
pricing disclosure requirements, and OSHA safety 
standards.  Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 66 (3d Cir. 
2014).  Similarly, in finding the New Jersey horseracing 
industry closely regulated, we looked to the industry’s 
licensing requirements for all employees in the industry, 
prohibitions on employing individuals convicted of 
certain crimes, and the creation of the New Jersey Racing 
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Commission with broad rulemaking authority.  
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 
1986).   
In addition, the Supreme Court in Patel noted that 
in the forty-five years since the administrative search 
doctrine was created, it “has identified only four 
industries that ‘have such a history of government 
oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy . . . 
could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an 
enterprise.’”  135 S. Ct. at 2454 (quoting Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)).  This doctrine 
is thus “the exception,” not the rule.  Barlow’s, 436 U.S. 
at 313.  The pornography industry, like the hotel industry 
in Patel, is not subjected to a level of regulation even 
approximating the pervasive regulation aimed at the 
liquor industry, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 (1970), firearms dealing, United 
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311-12 (1972), mining, 
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), or independent 
automobile junkyards, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 
(1987).  In Burger, for example, these regulations were 
backed by civil and criminal penalties, and some form of 
regulation had existed for at least 140 years.  Id. at 704, 
707.   
In contrast with the above-mentioned industries, 
the Government fails to identify any similar requirements 
for producers of sexually explicit images.  Nor are the 
regulations that the Government does identify sufficient.  
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First, the prohibition of child pornography is a broad 
proscription of a class of images and does not directly 
target the industry in which Plaintiffs are engaged.  Nor 
could it; Plaintiffs’ expression is constitutionally 
protected, while child pornography is not.  See Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 764.  Indeed, enforcement of the ban is not 
limited to only those engaged in the business of 
producing sexually explicit images.  The ban on child 
pornography is therefore more appropriately considered a 
generally applicable criminal law, not the targeted 
regulation of a legitimate industry.  Although the nature 
of Plaintiffs’ businesses enhances the chance that they 
might run afoul of these laws, that alone does not justify 
deeming the entire industry closely regulated.   
Second, the other provisions of the Statutes do not 
justify classifying producers of adult images as closely 
regulated.  To be sure, the Statutes require recordkeeping 
and labeling.  Yet no one is required to obtain a license or 
register with the Government before producing a sexually 
explicit image.  An artist can pick up a camera and create 
an image subject to the Statutes without the knowledge of 
any third party, much less the Government.  Nor has the 
Government identified any regulations governing the 
manner in which individuals and businesses must 
produce sexually explicit images.  The creation of 
sexually explicit expression is better characterized by its 
lack of regulation than by a regime of rules governing 
such expression. 
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Third, the Government also cannot rely on the 
inspection provisions of the Statutes and regulations to 
themselves establish that the industry is closely 
regulated.  The creation of sexually explicit images is not 
a “new or emerging industr[y]” to which the Government 
must respond to ensure public health and safety.  See 
Donovan, 452 U.S. at 606 (noting that some new 
industries, at the time including the nuclear power 
industry, can be subject to warrantless searches despite 
“the recent vintage of regulation”).  We are doubtful that 
the Government can create the reduced expectation of 
privacy of a closely regulated industry to justify 
warrantless inspections by simply mandating those 
inspections, particularly where that industry existed long 
before the regulation’s enactment.  See Patel, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2455 (“The City wisely refrains from arguing that [the 
challenged inspection provision] itself renders hotels 
closely regulated.”); Burger, 482 U.S. at 720 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he inspections themselves cannot be 
cited as proof of pervasive regulation justifying 
elimination of the warrant requirement; that would be 
obvious bootstrapping.”).  And in any event, as the 
Government readily acknowledges, no inspections have 
taken place since 2007.  This is hardly the “regularity of 
the regulation’s application,” FSC I, 677 F.3d at 544, that 
we would expect of a closely regulated industry.  For 
these reasons, we conclude that producers of sexually 
explicit images are not currently part of a closely 
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regulated industry, and this exception to the warrant 
requirement does not apply.  
2.   
This alone is sufficient to conclude that the 
warrantless searches authorized by this regime violate the 
Fourth Amendment.  In the interest of completeness, 
however, we also address why those inspections are 
unreasonable, even if producers of sexually explicit 
images were closely regulated.  For this inquiry, we 
consider whether “(1) the regulatory scheme furthers a 
substantial government interest; (2) the warrantless 
inspections are necessary to further the regulatory 
scheme; and (3) the inspection program, in terms of 
certainty and regularity of its application, is a 
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”  FSC 
I, 677 F.3d at 544 (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03).  
Having already discussed the substantiality of the 
Government’s interest in protecting children with this 
regulatory scheme, id. at 535, we need not dwell on that 
criterion of this test.  And because we find the 
warrantless inspections here unnecessary, we need not 
reach whether the inspection program is “a 
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”17   
                                                 
17 The District Court considered these three criteria as 
factors, as opposed to independent requirements.  Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d 
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Warrantless inspections are necessary where a 
warrant would undercut the regulatory scheme.  But the 
Government “need not show that warrantless searches are 
the most necessary way to advance its regulatory 
interest.”  Heffner, 745 F.3d at 68.  The need for 
warrantless searches is most clear where the 
“administrative inspection scheme[] . . . depend[s] on the 
element of surprise to both detect and deter violations.”  
Id.  Thus, in Donovan, warrantless inspections to ensure 
mine safety were necessary because “a warrant 
requirement could significantly frustrate effective 
enforcement of the Act” given “the notorious ease with 
which many safety or health hazards may be concealed if 
advance warning of inspection is obtained.”  452 U.S. at 
603.  Similarly, inspections of firearms dealers and 
                                                                                                             
564, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (describing “three-factor” 
Burger test”).  This was error.  As the Supreme Court 
explained, “[a] warrantless inspection, . . . even in the 
context of a pervasively regulated business, will be 
deemed to be reasonable only so long as [these] three 
criteria are met.”  New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 
(1987); Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2456 (“Even if we were to 
find that hotels are pervasively regulated, [the ordinance] 
would need to satisfy three additional criteria to be 
reasonable.”).  In other words, even if an inspection 
program is an adequate replacement for a warrant, the 
Government must still demonstrate that warrantless 
inspections are necessary in the first instance.   
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junkyards require unannounced, warrantless inspections 
in order to prevent the disposal of illicitly held items.  
Burger, 482 U.S. at 710 (citing United States v. Biswell, 
406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)).  By contrast, where 
inspections target conditions that are “relatively difficult 
to conceal or to correct in a short time,” warrants may be 
required.  Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (citing See v. City of 
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)).   
 Here, the Government has all but admitted that 
warrantless searches are unnecessary.  As the District 
Court found, “[b]oth FBI agents testified that it was 
highly unlikely that a producer could assemble Section 
2257 records” on short notice.  FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 
606.  And we agree with law enforcement’s testimony 
that the destruction of evidence is not a real concern, 
given that to do so would only compound any criminal 
violation of the Statutes.  Further, law enforcement here 
conducted nearly one third of its inspections under the 
Statutes after providing notice and without any reports of 
fabrication.  Thus, the record establishes that the type of 
records required to be maintained, given their scope as 
well as the need for indexing and cross-referencing, 
could not easily be recreated on short notice nor could 
violations be concealed.  Under these circumstances, 
“inspection warrants could be required and privacy given 
a measure of protection with little if any threat to the 
effectiveness of the inspection system.”  Biswell, 406 
U.S. at 316.   
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Administrative warrants18 provide “assurances 
from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable 
under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is 
pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific 
neutral criteria.”  Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323; see also 
Martin v. Int’l Matex Tank Terminals-Bayonne, 928 F.2d 
614, 621 (3d Cir. 1991).  These safeguards may only be 
abandoned if necessary, and, as the Government has 
conceded, their abandonment is not necessary here.19  
                                                 
18 There is a difference between searches for which no 
warrant is required, administrative searches that require 
an administrative search warrant, and ordinary searches 
that require a warrant based upon “probable cause in the 
criminal law sense.”  Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 320 (1978).  In this case, the Government 
maintains the closely regulated industry exception 
applies and, accordingly, warrantless searches are 
permissible.  We disagree.  We need not further decide 
whether administrative search warrants would suffice to 
cure the Fourth Amendment problem in this case, or 
whether warrants based on probable cause in the criminal 
law sense would be required.  See Martin v. Int’l Matex 
Tank Terminals-Bayonne, 928 F.2d 614, 621 (3d Cir. 
1991) (discussing the difference between the two). 
 
19 We also note that in Patel, the Supreme Court rejected 
the argument that affording “any opportunity for 
precompliance review would fatally undermine the 
scheme’s efficacy by giving operators a chance to falsify 
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Even if the administrative search exception to the warrant 
requirement for closely regulated industries were 
applicable in this case, this inspection regime is 
unreasonable.  Thus, the inspection regime prescribed by 
the Statutes and § 75.520 is facially unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                             
records,” an argument that “could be made regarding any 
recordkeeping requirement.”  135 S. Ct. at 2455.  If a fear 
of falsification were present, nothing could stop an FBI 
agent from obtaining an ex parte warrant or from 
guarding the records pending a hearing on a motion to 
quash.  Id.  
 
20 While we hold that the inspection regime is facially 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, we also 
consider dubious § 75.5’s requirement that producers 
make their records available for at least twenty hours per 
week during pre-established periods.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 75.5(c)(1).  In FSC III we questioned whether this 
requirement was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive 
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.  Given 
our holding that the Statutes (and their implementing 
regulations) are now subject to strict scrutiny, the 
constitutionality of this provision under the First 
Amendment is further in doubt.  Because we hold that 
§ 75.5 is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment, we see no need to reach this question. 
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VIII. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the 
District Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
claims.  We will remand to the District Court for further 
consideration of whether the Statutes are narrowly 
tailored such that they survive strict scrutiny.  We will 
also vacate the portion of the District Court’s judgment 
denying Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, and we 
will remand to the District Court to enter a judgment 
declaring that the warrantless searches authorized by the 
Statutes and § 75.5 are facially unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.21   
                                                 
21 Plaintiffs also renew their request for a permanent 
injunction.  The District Court’s denial of a permanent 
injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  
Relying on the Government’s 2008 disbandment of its 
inspection program, the District Court held that 
“Plaintiffs d[id] not face a realistic threat of ‘irreparable 
harm.’”  FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 609.  We note that 
the existence vel non of a threat of irreparable harm is a 
different inquiry from whether Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated injury-in-fact sufficient to support 
standing, as discussed supra.  Because we do not 
perceive any abuse of discretion and Plaintiffs fail to 
argue otherwise, we decline to issue a permanent 
injunction.   
 
 
Free Speech Coalition, Inc., et al. v. Attorney General 
No. 13-3681 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 We face a conundrum in this case in that we have two 
diametrically opposed Supreme Court precedents regarding 
the level of scrutiny to be applied. While reasonable minds 
definitely do disagree on this issue, I must respectfully dissent 
from the majority’s conclusion that Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), controls this case rather than 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence establishing the secondary 
effects doctrine. In declining to apply the doctrine here, the 
majority reasons that “any application of [it] beyond what the 
Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed would bring this case 
into direct conflict with Reed’s pronouncement that we 
cannot look behind a facially content-based law to a benign 
motive in order to shield the law from the rigors of strict 
scrutiny.” Maj. Op. 29. It therefore sends 18 U.S.C. §§ 2257 
and 2257A to face strict scrutiny, likely dooming these laws 
that were enacted to reduce the criminal harm to minors that 
flows from child pornography. But rather than take this 
drastic step, I am of the view that we should apply the 
secondary effects doctrine—which has direct application 
here—and save these laws from unconstitutionality. Cf. Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) 
(“[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in 
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).1      
                                              
 1 In Free Speech III, although we applied intermediate 
scrutiny and upheld §§ 2257 and 2257A as constitutional 
2 
 
 The secondary effects doctrine has long served as an 
exception to the rule that facially content-based laws must 
undergo strict scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1986) (applying doctrine 
and concluding that a law was content neutral even though on 
its face it “treat[ed] theaters that specialize in adult films 
differently from other kinds of theaters”).2 Under the 
doctrine, a facially content-based law will nonetheless be 
deemed content neutral and thus subject to intermediate 
scrutiny if it was enacted not to suppress protected speech but 
to reduce harmful secondary effects—such as crime—that are 
uniquely caused by or associated with the protected speech 
that is singled out by the law. Id. at 48; see also Elena Kagan, 
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 
483 (1996) (“The essence of the secondary effects doctrine 
runs as follows: facially content-based regulations of speech 
that ‘are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech’ should be treated as if they made no facial 
distinctions on the basis of content.” (citations omitted)).    
 
                                                                                                     
under the First Amendment, “we noted that the Statutes may 
not have been able to survive strict scrutiny.” Maj. Op. 16 
(citing Free Speech Coal. Inc. v. Att’y Gen. (FSC III), 787 
F.3d 142, 156 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated and reh’g granted, 
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15448 (3d Cir. Sept. 01, 2015)); see 
also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (“[I]t is 
the rare case in which . . . a law survives strict scrutiny.”).  
 2 But see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 
291–96 (2000) (plurality opinion) (relying on the secondary 
effects doctrine to uphold a facially neutral law).  
3 
 
 In 2015, however, the Supreme Court complicated 
matters when it issued its opinion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
a case involving a local sign ordinance that the Court held to 
be content based on its face. In reversing the Ninth Circuit 
and striking down the ordinance, the Court stressed that “the 
crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis” is 
“determining whether the law is content neutral on its face.” 
135 S. Ct. at 2228. Then, seemingly departing from prior 
precedent, it stated that “[a] law that is content based on its 
face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the 
government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or 
lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated 
speech.” Id. (citation omitted); see also id. (“In other words, 
an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-
based law into one that is content neutral.”).    
 
 The secondary effects doctrine thus seems logically 
irreconcilable with Reed. The doctrine constitutes an 
exception to the rule that facially content-based laws must 
undergo strict scrutiny. But we are left wondering whether 
Reed has eliminated this exception with its sweeping rule that 
facially content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny 
regardless of the government’s motives for enacting the law. 
It would appear so.3  
 
 Yet we cannot conclude that the secondary effects 
doctrine no longer applies, because the Court in Reed never 
                                              
 3 An argument could be made, however, that Reed is 
not as broad as it seems, as the Court neither addressed the 
secondary effects doctrine nor unequivocally ruled out the 
possibility that strict scrutiny might not apply to a different 
facially content-based law.   
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addressed or even mentioned it—let alone overruled Renton 
or any of the other secondary effects precedent. The Court has 
admonished that other courts cannot conclude that “[its] more 
recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier 
precedent.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); see 
also Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 
U.S. 1, 18 (2000) (“This Court does not normally overturn, or 
so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio.”).4    
 
 We must therefore decide how to resolve this conflict 
between Supreme Court precedent applying the secondary 
effects doctrine and Reed’s sweeping rule that facially 
content-based laws must undergo strict scrutiny. Fortunately, 
the Supreme Court has given us guidance as to how to do so: 
it has instructed that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct 
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in 
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989). The issue, then, is whether the secondary effects 
doctrine—which seems to rest on reasons rejected by the 
Court in Reed—has “direct application” in this case. Or, does 
Reed’s sweeping rule have “direct application” here such that 
§§ 2257 and 2257A must undergo strict scrutiny?   
 
 In my view, the secondary effects doctrine has direct 
application here. The Court over the years has applied the 
secondary effects analysis to laws involving a diverse range 
                                              
 4 Indeed, other courts have reasoned that Reed’s failure 
to mention certain precedent calling for intermediate scrutiny 
means that that precedent survives Reed. See infra note 7. 
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of subject matter.5 But it has actually found such effects 
almost exclusively in the context of facially content-based 
laws that affect sexually explicit speech. See, e.g., City of Los 
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429–31 (2002) 
(ordinance prohibiting no more than one “adult entertainment 
business” in same building that was enacted to reduce crime 
in areas with these businesses); Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48 
(ordinance restricting the location of adult movie theaters that 
was enacted to reduce crime and blight in areas with these 
theaters); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 52–55 
(1976) (plurality opinion) (same).6 Indeed, the Court created 
the doctrine based on the premise that sexually explicit 
                                              
 5 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) (commercial speech); Boos v. 
Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1988) (political speech). 
 6 The majority contends that the Court has actually 
found such effects only in the narrow context of “regulations 
affecting physical purveyors of adult sexually explicit 
content.” Maj. Op. 24. But the plurality in Pap’s rejected this 
myopic view of the doctrine. See Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 295 
(“Justice Stevens claims [in his dissent] that today we ‘[f]or 
the first time’ extend Renton’s secondary effects doctrine to 
justify restrictions other than the location of a commercial 
enterprise. Our reliance on Renton to justify other restrictions 
is not new, however. In Ward, the Court relied on Renton to 
evaluate restrictions on sound amplification at an outdoor 
bandshell, rejecting the dissent’s contention that Renton was 
inapplicable.”); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518, 2531–32 (2014) (relying on Renton in concluding that 
abortion-clinic buffer-zone law was content neutral”); id. at 
2543–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
reliance on Renton). 
6 
 
speech by its very nature can cause or correlate with societal 
harms such as crime and blight in a way that other kinds of 
protected speech typically cannot. See Am. Mini Theatres, 
427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (agreeing that “a concentration of ‘adult’ 
movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a 
focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters 
showing other types of films”).  
 
 Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly articulated a 
related, but even more fundamental, reason as to why the 
doctrine and intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws 
affecting sexually explicit speech: this kind of speech, though 
protected, categorically deserves less protection than others 
kinds of protected speech. That is because, simply put, 
sexually explicit speech is not as vital to our society as other 
kinds of protected speech. See id. at 70 (“[E]ven though we 
recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total 
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably 
artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting 
this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, 
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . 
. .[and that] few of us would march our sons and daughters 
off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see [sexually 
explicit speech].”); Pap’s, 529 U.S. at 294 (relying on this 
language); Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 n.2. Thus, the plurality in 
American Mini Theatres—the case in which the secondary 
effects doctrine was first recognized—concluded that “[e]ven 
though the First Amendment protects communications in this 
area from total suppression, . . . the State may legitimately use 
the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in 
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a different classification” from other materials. 427 U.S. at 
70–71.7  
 
 To be sure, the Court has not blindly concluded that 
any law that affects sexually explicit speech would qualify as 
                                              
 7 The Court also established years ago that the 
Constitution “accords a lesser protection” to another distinct 
form of speech—commercial speech—and has therefore 
applied intermediate scrutiny to laws affecting this speech. 
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–66 (1980). Notably, because the 
Court in Reed never even mentioned Central Hudson, at least 
two district courts in California have concluded that Reed 
does not compel strict scrutiny for laws affecting commercial 
speech. See CTIA-The Wireless Assoc. v. City of Berkeley, 
Cal., No. C-15-2529, 2015 WL 5569072, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 21, 2015) (“The Supreme Court has clearly made a 
distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial 
speech, see, e.g., Central Hudson . . ., and nothing in its 
recent opinions, including Reed, even comes close to 
suggesting that that well-established distinction is no longer 
valid.”); Cal. Outdoor Equity Partners v. City of Corona, No. 
CV 15-03172, 2015 WL 4163346, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 
2015) (“Reed does not concern commercial speech, let alone 
bans on off-site billboards. The fact that Reed has no bearing 
on this case is abundantly clear from the fact that Reed does 
not even cite Central Hudson, let alone apply it.”); see also 
Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Cty. of Alameda, 114 F. 
Supp. 3d 952, 968–69 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting plaintiffs’ 
argument that Reed governed a regulation that banned 
commercial speech and applying intermediate scrutiny to that 
regulation).        
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having been enacted to combat secondary effects of the 
protected speech. In Reno v. ACLU, for example, the Court 
held that the government could not rely on the doctrine 
because the law at issue sought to alleviate not secondary but 
“primary effects” of sexually explicit speech, which it defined 
as “‘the direct impact of [the] speech on its audience.’” 521 
U.S. 844, 868 (2000) (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321)). The 
law was the federal Communications Decency Act, which 
criminalized “the knowing transmission of obscene or 
indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age,” as 
well as the “knowing sending or displaying of patently 
offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person 
under 18 years of age.” Id. at 859. The Court rejected the 
government’s secondary effects argument, concluding that 
“the purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the 
primary effects of ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ speech, 
rather than any ‘secondary’ effect of such speech.” Id. at 868; 
see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 
803, 815 (2000) (determining that doctrine did not save a 
federal law from strict scrutiny that restricted cable 
pornography because its objective was to shield children from 
“the primary effects of [the] protected speech”). 
 
 Given these parameters of the doctrine, I suggest that it 
has “direct application” in this case, although it “appears to 
rest on reasons rejected in [Reed].” Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 
U.S. at 484. Sections 2257 and 2257A are facially content-
based laws because they impose restrictions based on the 
content of the speech, i.e., they apply only to depictions of 
“actual sexually explicit conduct” and “simulated sexually 
explicit conduct.” But the reason for the restrictions is based 
on a secondary effect of this protected speech, namely the 
criminal harm to children that flows from child pornography, 
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a harm that is uniquely attributable, at least in some cases, to 
this speech. See Maj. Op. 5–6 (Congress enacted these laws 
because, despite the criminalization of child pornography, 
“producers of sexually explicit materials continued to utilize 
youthful-looking performers. Law enforcement was viewed 
as ill-equipped to visually determine these performers’ ages, 
and, as a consequence, the risk that children were still being 
used in pornographic materials remained.”). And “it is 
manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of 
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than 
the interest in” protecting other kinds of speech. Am. Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70; see also id. at 70–71 (“Even though 
the First Amendment protects communications in this area 
from total suppression, we hold that the State may 
legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for 
placing them in a different classification [from other 
materials].”). Finally, §§ 2257 and 2257A were not enacted 
by Congress to mitigate any “primary effects” of this 
protected but low-value speech. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. 
v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 534 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that 
Congress did not target the speech affected by these laws 
because of its “effect on audiences or any disagreement with 
[its] underlying message”).   
 
  Rather than hold that §§ 2257 and 2257A are subject 
to strict scrutiny in light of Reed, I would affirm the District 
Court’s determination that these laws are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, but remand for it to apply the burden-
shifting framework applicable to secondary effects cases as 
set forth by the Supreme Court in Alameda Books.8 Thus, I 
                                              
 8 See 535 U.S. at 426 (“The [government’s] evidence 
must fairly support [its] rationale for its ordinance. If 
10 
 
respectfully dissent from this portion of the majority’s 
opinion.  
                                                                                                     
plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by 
demonstrating that the [government’s] evidence does not 
support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes 
the [government’s] factual findings, the [government] meets 
the standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs succeed in 
casting doubt on a [government’s] rationale in either manner, 
the burden shifts back to the [government] to supplement the 
record with evidence renewing support for a theory that 
justifies its ordinance.”). 
